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Abstract
Cross-section dispersion of expected inflation is often explained by differences in
information sets across agents, but there is little empirical evidence attesting to that. The
purpose of this paper is to examine whether dispersion in consumer forecasts of inflation
is generated by factors such as relative price observations, different perceptions of
monetary policy, and personal characteristics. We use unique data from Bulgaria that
allow us to examine such effects at the micro level.
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Sources of Dispersion in Inflation Forecasts
1.

Introduction.
Studies of expected inflation using survey data invariably find that professional

forecasters as well as consumers form widely different forecasts of inflation. Such
disagreement among respondents is usually interpreted as "uncertainty" regarding future
inflation. Intuitively, disagreement may be a good measure. Uncertainty generated by the
lack of timely and clear information and the difficulty to predict the effect of various
events on inflation are likely to produce individual forecasts that differ across agents.
While uncertainty may be accompanied by disagreement, disagreement itself
could be generated by other factors such as differences in agents' information sets.
Several papers have studied the use of disagreement as a measure of subjective
uncertainty. The evidence is mixed. Zamowitz and Lambros (1987) show that direct
measures of individual uncertainty derived from the ASA-NBER survey are generally
correlated with disagreement but often exhibit very different time properties.! Rich and
Butler (1998) have an even stronger conclusion: "our findings question the conclusions
drawn from studies that have used forecast dispersion measures from survey series to
examine the effect of inflation uncertainly on macroeconomic activity".2 What other
factors might contribute to the dispersion of forecasts? In this paper, we use unique
survey data from Bulgaria to examine the effect of different information sets, particularly
different real income experiences, on the dispersion of perceived and expected inflation.
Whether relative price dispersion generates inflation forecast dispersion is not a
new question. Univariate regressions indicate that such relationship indeed exists.
However, significant relative price shifts usually occur along with higher levels of
inflation. Therefore, it is not clear whether dispersion of relative prices or the uncertainty
associated with higher inflation generates differences in forecasts. Batchelor and Orr
(1991) use UK consumer data to try to separate the two effects and conclude that it is
policy factors and not observed past and current prices that generate disagreement among
I Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) write: "Our results suggest that consensus statistics probably often
understate the level of uncertainty. They may also overstate the variations in uncertainty." Pp.606.
Analysis of such measures of subjective uncertainty can also be found in Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996).
2 Rich and Butler (1998) pp 418. Batchelor and Dua (1996) provide an extensive list of papers that have
used disagreement proxy for uncertainty in macroeconomic econometrics.
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agents. 3 Earlier, Solow (1980) has made similar suggestions when, in criticizing rational
expectations, he writes about the "undocumented assertion" that infonnation sets differ.
Starting with Lucas (1972), much theoretical and empirical work is based on the
assumption that agents forecast the general price level using observations of a few
prices. 4 Yet, there is no direct empirical evidence of that.
As in Batchelor and Orr (1991), we show that agents' perceptions of the policy
regime can indeed produce differences in expected inflation. We show however that
differences are also driven by different perceptions of the past and current price
movements. This in itself is not a new result as several papers have shown that expected
inflation is strongly determined by perceived past inflation. 5 What has been hypothesized
but not shown empirically is that perceptions differ because individuals have different
real income experiences. We provide such evidence.
We also study the effect of agents' attitude towards the monetary regime. In
contrast to earlier results (Vartia, P. and R. Mankinen (1984)), we find that expected
inflation has smaller dispersion across agents than perceptions of past inflation. This
result is intriguing because it suggests convergence of expected inflation attributable to
forward-looking expectations about the effectiveness of a new monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some of the
literature on disagreement. Then we describe a survey taken in Bulgaria one year after the
introduction of a currency board and give background infonnation on actual price
movements. In sections 5 and 6 we discuss our findings and conclude with final remarks
in section 7.

2.

Sources of Disagreement.
Michael (1979) shows substantial variation in the cost of consumption baskets

across individual households. Given an adaptive component in expected inflation, that
might explain why expected inflation varies across individuals in consumer surveys such
as the Michigan survey. By implication, the closer the perceptions, the greater will be the
Batchelor and Orr (1991) conclude: "Much theoretical work on the relation between inflation and
economic fluctuations assumes that individuals acquire information about future price movements mainly
from observations of current and past price movements. Our results suggest that this is not the case, or at
least that perceptions of government policy are more important."
4 See for example the widely cited papers by Cukierman and Watcher (1979, 1982a, 1982b).
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consensus in expectations. There is some indirect evidence for that. Carlson (1981, p. 27)
writes: "there is not nearly as much variance in the forecasts of inflation [in the
Livingston survey] as is found in the surveys of households. This is presumably because,
being knowledgeable observers of the economy, these respondents know pretty well what
the rate of inflation has been in the last year or so. Since differences in perceptions of
inflation account for much of the differences in a household's stated expectations, this
major source of variation is not present in the Livingston survey." Further evidence may
be the skewness in consumer surveys that appears to pattern the skewness in relative
price changes. Again, such skewness is not present in the Livingston survey.
As we wrote in the introduction, univariate regressions do reveal that
disagreement among agents is significantly correlated with greater relative price
dispersion. 6 The problem with such regression is that increased volatility of relative
prices is usually accompanied by a higher overall level of inflation.? As suggested by
Friedman (1977), higher inflation may create uncertainty because it implies a greater
probability of a switch in government policy compared to an environment of low
inflation. Hence it is not clear whether different experiences with real incomes or the
overall uncertainty about inflation generates disagreement among respondents. 8 This
raises an empirical issue of separating the effect of overall inflation from the effect of
relative price changes. Batchelor and Orr (1991) perform such tests and find no
significant effect of relative price shifts. Because of the widely held opinion that
information sets drive differences in expected inflation, they conclude that their results
are "sufficiently disturbing" to warrant robustness checks by parallel studies in other
countries.
The need for information may also influence the dispersion of forecasts. Fishe and
Idson (1990) for example show that the dispersion of consumer forecasts is smaller for
agents with potentially greater demand for price information such as agents with higher
5 See Jonung (1981), Jonung and Laidler (1988), Vartia and Mankinen (1984), and Simmons and Weiserbs
(1992).
6 The survey from Finland used by Vartia and Mankinen (1984) attempts to control for that by describing to
respondents the consumption basket of the average citizen before asking about the percentage change in its
rrice. That measure alone does not produce a consensus.
Parks (1978).
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income. Baghestani (1992) shows that the demand for information increases in periods of
more unpredictable overall inflation.
In addition to uncertainty about future inflation, disagreement among consumers
might have different explanations from disagreement among professional forecasters.
Lester, Bennett, and Geoum (1999) for example provide evidence that professional
forecasters may behave strategically and purposefully deviate from the consensus
forecast. In Batchelor and Dua (1990) and in Cho and Hersch (1998) forecasters' school
of thought and institutional setting are sources of differences.
A difficulty with putting the results of the literature into a unified context is that
papers use different data and time periods from different countries. This is mostly due to
data limitations as the construct of various surveys allow test of different hypotheses.
Davis and Kanago (1998) attempt to remedy that by building panel data from 40
countries. The limitation in terms of studying disagreement is that data are available only
for the consensus forecasts.

3.

Survey data and hypotheses.
The data used in this paper were obtained from a national survey conducted in the

last week of May 1998 in Bulgaria. The sample size, WOO respondents, is considered
representative for the country. The survey was part of a research project to study the role
of expectations for inflation convergence following the introduction of a currency board
on July 1, 1997. There were four questions regarding perceived and expected inflation.
The first question asks whether prices in general have increased, decreased or remained
the same in the last six months (December 1997 through May 1998), and the second
question requests a percentage estimate if the respondent had perceived a decrease or an
increase in prices. The third and the fourth questions ask whether prices in general would
increase, decrease or remain the same in the next six months and, if a change is expected,
by what percentage.
There has been no direct empirical evidence that differences in real income
history generate cross-sectional variance in perceptions of past inflation. Therefore,
testing that hypothesis is our first objective. To illustrate, consider a continuum of agents
In fact, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) suggest that in periods of high and unstable inflation, agents may
invest greater resources in the acquisition of information and hence arrive at forecasts that are closer to a
consensus. Ungar and Zilberfarb (1993) provide evidence contrary to that hypothesis.
8
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indexed Sj

E

[0,1]. The consumption basket of each agent consists of two goods with

prices Pit and P2t in period t. Agent Sj purchases Sj of good 1 and (l-Sj) of good 2. Hence,
the price index for agent Sj in period tis:
PtG) = SjPit + (1-Sj)P2t

( 1)

while the official average price level is:
(2)

Pt = Bplt + (1-8)P2t

where

ii is

the consumption of the average agent. Subtract (2) from (1) and take first

differences:
(3)

~PtG)

-

- ~Pt =(Sj - 8 )(~Plt - ~P2t)

Surveys of perceived inflation ask for the value of

~Pt.

Clearly, the most direct

way to answer that question is to recall the official (CPI) inflation. Agents are observed
however to provide very different answers. This suggests that the official reports on
prices are not conunon knowledge and that agents instead are trying to provide a guess of
~Pt.

The sources of differences across agents may be due to different perception of ~Plt

or ~P2t. Or it may be because of uncertainty about the value of

ii , and agents are biased

toward assuming that the average agent has consumption patterns similar to their own.
From (3), it follows that an agent's perceived inflation will differ from the official
inflation by more the further her consumption basket is from the average consumption
basket and the greater the difference in the changes in individual prices.
Three questions were included in the survey to test these propositions. First,
respondents were asked to name at most three products from the prices of which they
draw their perceptions of inflation. They could name any goods or services or could say
that "prices in general" have changed. The question was intended to test whether agents
do think of particular products when they answer a question about the general price level.
We test the hypothesis that agents who mention products that had large price increases
(decreases) in the last six months will be more likely to report a perceived increase
(decrease) in the general price level.
Two questions draw on the observation that food prices exhibited significant price
volatility relative to other products. One question asks respondents to identify whether
they are primarily responsible for food purchases in their household and another question
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asks what proportion of a respondent's household income is spent on food. With both
questions, we test the hypothesis that agents who had greater exposure to food prices are
more likely to hold perceptions that are further away from the average.
Next, we examine the formation of expectations. In particular, we test the
hypothesis that expectations contain a backward and a forward-looking component:
( 4)

/).p,' (j)

= ASp, (j) + (1- A)/).Pt-l (j)

where Sp, (j) is the belief of agent j regarding an underlying long-run inflation and
0<A<1. To test that hypothesis we assume that the primary difference across respondents
in their beliefs about underlying inflation depends on whether or not they support the
current government, which introduced a currency board a year earlier.
Currency boards are institutions that replace central banks and are designed to
ensure that domestic currency can be purchased on demand at a fixed exchange rate.
Some monetary aggregate, usually the monetary base, is backed by foreign exchange
reserves. In its Orthodox form, a currency board has no responsibilities regarding the
provision of liquidity to the banking system, financing the budget deficit or
unemployment. Inflation convergence in recent currency boards (Argentina, Estonia, and
Lithuania) has had differing success. In Argentina, inflation converged to levels close to
zero while in Estonia it has persisted at moderate levels of 10-15 percent annually. The
design of the currency board in Bulgaria is such that the monetary base is not completely
endogenous to changes in foreign exchange reserves. Through the balance sheet of the
currency board, the amount of reserves is closely linked to the execution of the state
budget and to another institution that supervises the banking system. 9 These, coupled
with capital controls, give some monetary independence but make the strength of the peg
questionable and, respectively, give grounds for politicizing the opinions about the effect
of the currency board on the economy. These differences were evident in the media
where the forecasts for inflation in government-affiliated papers were significantly more
optimistic than in the opposition-affiliated papers. In the survey, naming the party a
respondent would vote for if elections were held today indicates political attitudes.
In all estimations, we were able to control for demographic differences as
respondents provided personal characteristics such as age, gender, education, place of
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residency, ethnicity, and employment status. Income data were provided by too few
respondents to be usable in all estimations. 10

4.

Actual price changes.
CPI inflation in Bulgaria averaged close to 40 percent per month in the year

leading to the introduction ofa currency board on July 1, 1997. Starting twelve months
before that date, it increased from around 2 percent per month to about 20 percent per
month and continued to accelerate. The peak was in February when consumer prices
increased by 242 percent before subsiding to a level of 3 percent monthly 2-3 months
before the introduction of the currency board. In the first four months with a currency
board, inflation declined from the level of about 3 percent per month to a level of around
1 percent. The cumulative increase in the CPI for the period December 1997 - May 1998,
which is the period of the six months before the survey, was 5.86 percent. In the six
months after the survey, consumer prices declined by a cumulative 2.35 percent. The
decline was relatively evenly spread out across all six months, with the exception of
September when prices increased by 3.02 percent. In general, the overall inflation in the
period respondents were asked about, six months before and six months after the survey,
was fairly low and stable but had a slight downward trend.
The largest categories in the CPI are Foods (55.8 percent), Residential utilities
(10.2

percent),

Clothing and other small

personal

belongings

(8.6

percent),

Transportation and communications (7.9 percent). It is often argued that changes in
consumption baskets, as real incomes fell post communism, were not adequately
reflected in the CPI weights. Hence, official estimates of inflation may be regarded with
less than full confidence and economic agents resort to personal experiences to estimate
past inflation. Official data on inflation are published with an approximately one-month
delay so that respondents in this survey had access to official numbers about April.
However, respondents were asked about perceived inflation including the month of May
as the survey was conducted in the very end of that month and asked about prices in the
last six months without specifying the exact period.

See Bulgarian National Bank "Annual Report" 1998.
We performed robustness checks with the available income data and found no qualitative differences in
results.
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There were some notable movements in relative prices over that six-month period.
First, food prices increased by 8.44 percent (compared with an overall price increase of
5.86 percent). However in the last two months before the survey, April and May, food
prices declined by 0.1 percent while the overall CPI index increased by 0.6 percent.
Second, there were significant changes in the prices of several products that are important
in the Bulgarian consumption basket. Table 1 identifies those products and shows the
cumulative percentage change in their prices in the December - May period as well as
their weight in the CPI. In addition, Table 1 shows the percentage change in the prices of
these products in the month of May, the most recent price movements that respondents
experienced. Note that the price dynamics of some products was different during
December -May, the period respondent were asked about, and in the month of May. For
example, the price of milk increased by 2.7 percent in the December-May period,
somewhat less than the CPI increase of 5.86 percent. However in May, while the CPI
increased by 0.5 percent, milk prices declined by 6 percent. Similar patterns, with large
decreases in prices in May, are also observed for cheese, feta cheese, and eggs. Among
the products that increased in price, cooking oil, fruits and potatoes had an extraordinary
increase in price in May. The distinction is important because more recent price
movements may affect perceptions with greater weight. Note that most of the dynamics
in relative prices can be associated with foods.
5.

Perceived inflation.

Four percent of the respondents did not indicate whether they had perceived an
increase, decrease or no change in prices in the last six months. Of those who provided an
answer, 40 percent had perceived an increase and 11 percent a decrease in prices. Almost
half of the respondents, 49 percent, answered that prices have not changed. Most likely,
agents report "no change" if perceived inflation falls within a certain range around zero.
It is possible that this range is widened by the recent experience with very high inflation.
Eighty-five percent of those who perceived a decrease and 77 percent of those
who perceived an increase in prices provided a numerical estimate of that increase or
decrease. To calculate the average perceived inflation across agents we need to make
some assumption about the perceptions of those who reported "no change". Figure 1 plots
the percentage of respondents who did provide various estimates of the past changes in
9

prices. Also plotted is a nonnal distribution bell curve using sample mean and variance.
The number of observations is 380.
Mean perceived inflation for those who reported an estimate of past inflation is
12.57 (the median is 10). If we assume that "no change" means zero inflation, then the
weighted average for the whole sample is 6.59 percent (using the medians we get 4.9
percent). That estimate is very close to the actual inflation, 5.86 percent.

Figure 1

however shows that few respondents, only 13 percent, gave an estimate of inflation in the
0-9 range. Given that actual inflation is 5.86 percent, one would expect a significantly
larger proportion of agents to fall in this category if all were to provide an estimate.
Hence, it appears that "no change" may mean positive but "low" inflation. If that were
the case, the average for the whole sample might be greater than the actual inflation
indicating that agents on average overstated inflation. Because of the ambiguity about
how to treat "no change" answers, we focus in what follows primarily on the qualitative
response of increase/decrease/no change instead of on the percentage estimate.
Clearly from Figure 1, differences in perceptions across individuals are
substantial. What is the source of such disagreement? Jonung (1981), Jonung and Laidler
(1988), Vartia and Mankinen (1984), and Simmons and Weiserbs (1992) all report that
perceptions differ across agents but provide no direct evidence that agents' expenditure
patterns generate those differences. II
After agents stated whether they had perceived a decrease, increase or no change
In

prices in general and had provided a percentage estimate, the survey asked the

respondents who had indicated either an increase or a decrease in prices to name three
products, if any, from the prices of which they primarily draw their impressions of price
movements. Only 4 percent indicated an overall index of prices and 67 percent named at
least one product.
Table 2 identifies the most frequently mentioned product among those who
thought prices had fallen and those who thought prices had risen. The respondents who
who perceived a decrease in the general price level mentioned products that had actually
significantly decreased in price such as Feta, Milk, Meats, and Cheeses (refer to Table 1

11 Jonung (1981) attributes the differences between male and female perceptions to the greater exposure of
female respondents to food prices. which behaved differently from the general price level.
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for actual price changes). Respondents who perceived an increase in prices mentioned
products that had actually increased in prices such as cooking oil and transportation.
Different personal experiences appear to drive differences in perceptions.
To quantify that effect we created two variables - "Increase" equals one if the
respondent named a product the relative price of which had increased and zero otherwise,
and "Decrease" if the respondent had mentioned a product the relative price of which had
actually decreased during the last six months, zero otherwise. 12 Those two variables
along with gender, education and age were used to explain the likelihood that a
respondent perceived a decrease, an increase or no change in the general price level. The
estimates from that equation are reported in Table 3. Respondents' assessment of the
movements of prices in general were clearly affected by the change in price of individual
products.
Recall that most of the larger price movements were associated with foods. This
allows us to perform an additional test of the effect of relative price changes on the
dispersion of perceived inflation. In particular, on average, agents who had greater
exposure to food prices will be more likely to report a decrease or an increase rather than
no change in the general price level. To test that proposition, we created a variable that
equals 0 if a respondent perceived no change and 1 if a respondent perceived a decrease
or an increase in prices. That variable was explained by the proportion of household
income spent on food as well as by whether the respondent is primarily responsible for
food purchases in hislher household. Note the difference between the two questions. The
former refers to a "consumption" experience while the latter refers to a "purchasing"
experience, which may differ except for households of one person. Table 4 reports the
parameter estimates from those equations. Agents with greater household expenditure on
foods were more likely to report an answer different from "no change. 13

Stronger but qualitatively equivalent results were obtained using only May price changes.
Qualitatively equivalent results were obtained by including "consumption" and "purchasing" experience
in the same equation. The proportion of household income spent on food does not affect whether a
respondent would perceive a decrease versus an increase in prices. Recall that food prices were increasing
faster than the CPI for most of the period but also declined in the last two months before the survey. The
same applies for whether a respondent is the primary food purchaser in hislher household.
12

13
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6.

Expected inflation.
Only six percent of the respondents did not indicate if they expected a decrease,

increase or no change in prices over the next six months.

However, fewer agents

reported an estimate of expected inflation (302) compared to the agents who reported an
estimate of perceived inflation (380). This, following Fishe and Idson (1990), may be
interpreted as greater uncertainty regarding the future than the past. Of those who
answered, 37 percent indicated an increase, 7 percent a decrease and 56 percent no
expected change in prices.
Figure 2 plots the frequency of various ranges of reported expected inflation. As
with perceived inflation, most answers fall in the 10-19 percent range possibly indicating
that a large portion of those that expect inflation of 0-9 percent chose to report "no
change". The mean expected inflation of those who reported an estimate, 11.42, is close
to the mean perceived inflation of 12.57. As events unfolded this expectation was largely
wrong. Prices actually declined by 2.35 percent.
Note that the distribution of expected inflation is tighter than the distribution of
perceived inflation. In fact, the equality of the standard deviation of the two distributions
is rejected at the 0.01 level. Where did the mean reversion in estimates come from?
Perhaps the agents who had "extreme" perceptions decided not to give an estimate
of future inflation or all agents on average brought their expectations to the consensus
variable compared to their perceptions.

14

The data support the latter but not the fonner

argument. To test the validity of the second hypothesis, we regressed the difference
between an agent's estimate of expected inflation and the sample mean expected inflation
on the difference between that agent's perceived inflation and the sample mean perceived
inflation. The coefficient was positive, significant and robust to the inclusion of
demographic variables. Its size, 0.39, however, indicates that agents on average brought
their expectations closer around a consensus compared to their perceptions.
The evidence of mean reversion is opposite to what is usually expected. Agents
should be more uncertain about the future than the past and hence produce more spread14 Most but not all of those who reported an estimate for future inflation had reported an estimate for past
inflation. One hundred and sixty six agents gave perception estimates but no expectations estimate and 88
agents gave expectations estimates but no perception estimates. Intriguingly, some experiments with the
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out estimates of future than of past inflation. This is what Vartia and Mankinen (1984)
find using Finnish consumer survey data. Why is that different in the Bulgarian survey?
Perhaps the reason was the ongoing convergence in prices following the introduction of
the currency board. Agents had different real income experiences as the result of relative
price shifts but on average expected large fluctuations in prices gradually to subside as
the currency board system settled in. Actual price movements over the six months
following the survey reveal that relative prices indeed did not fluctuate as widely as in the
six months before the survey.
To come back to our analysis of the qualitative response, Table 5 reports a crosstabulation of respondents who reported both perceptions and expectations about the
direction of price changes. The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of those in
each group of perceived change who reported a particular direction for expected price
changes.
Seventy one percent of those who perceived an "increase" also expect an
"increase," 83 percent of those who perceived "no change" also expect "no change", and
only 33 percent of those who perceived a "decrease" expect a "decrease". There is an
asymmetry here in that those who perceived a decrease are much less likely to expect a
further decrease in prices than those who perceived an increase are likely to expect a
further increase in prices. Presumably this asymmetry can be attributed to a generally
perceived longer-run upward trend in prices. In addition, there is a tendency for some
respondents to expect a reversal of the most recent perceived change and for some of
those who perceived no change in price to expect a decrease in prices as well as others to
expect an increase. These responses suggest a certain amount of random noise in the
response patterns.
Recall equation (4) with the addition of a noise term:
(5)

8.p; (j)

= MPt (j) + (1- A )!lPt-J (j)

+ utU)

Expected inflation is a weighted average of recently perceived inflation and an expected
underlying trend inflation plus other influences represented by utU). The expected trend
inflation, however, may differ across agents. In the case of Bulgaria, as we discussed
data suggest that education was a factor in providing an estimate of past inflation but income was a factor
in providing an estimate of future inflation.
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earlier, it is plausible that agents who support the current economic policy (currency
board) would also hold more favorable expectations of long-run inflation. In addition,
given the actual decline in prices in the six months following the survey, it would not
have been a stretch to report a decrease or no change in future prices even if the agent
reported an increase in past prices. Such "favorable" inflation developments were often
advanced in the government affiliated media. To provide a simple test of that proposition,
Table 6 partitions the agents who perceived a decrease, increase or no change in prices
into two groups - those who support and those who oppose the current government.
Clearly, the supporters are much more likely to expect a decrease in prices and not to
expect an increase in prices than the political opponents of the government.
To examine equation (5) statistically, we created two variables: "Perceived
Decrease" equal to 1 if an agent perceived a decrease in prices and 0 otherwise, and
"Perceived Increase" equal to 1 if an agent perceived an increase in prices and 0
otherwise. Those variables along with political affiliation and demographics were used to
explain expected inflation. The results are reported in Table 7.
Table 7 supports the hypothesis that expectations contain a strong adaptive
component in that expectations are significantly influenced by perceptions of past price
movements. In addition, the forward-looking component differs across individuals as
indicated by the negative and significant effect of political attitudes on expected inflation.

7. Conclusion.
This paper examines the variations in expected inflation across individuals. Using
survey data from Bulgaria, we find that a significant portion of the differences in
expectations can be attributed to differences in perceived past inflation. The variation in
perceived inflation, in tum, is explained by the combination of relative price shifts and
different expenditure patterns across individuals. Very few respondents report basing
their perceptions of inflation on official statistics on the overall inflation rate.
Perceptions, however, are not the only significant influence on the cross sectional
distribution of expectations. In fact, we find evidence that expected inflation is a
weighted average of a backward and a forward-looking component. The backwardlooking component is manifested by the strong effect of perceptions on expectations. The
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forward-looking component is evidenced by the effect on expectations of a difference
across agents in their beliefs about the longer-term implications of the monetary regime.
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Figure 1. Perceived Inflation. Each bar represents a 1O-percentage point range.

.3

.2

.1

o
< -29

>59

10-19

Figure 2. Expected Inflation. Each bar represents a 1O-percentage point range.
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Table 1
Relative price changes.
December 97 - May 98
Goods with
Relative price
increases
12/97-05/98

Weight
in the
CPI
index

Percent
change in
prices
12/9705/98

Percent
change in
prices
05/98

Goods with
Relative price
decreases
12/97-05/98

Weight
in the
CPI
index
I

Percent
change in
prices
1219705/98

Percent
change in
prices
05/98

Fresh
vegetables

3.68

119.5

-0.4

Meat

6.04

-13.0

-2.9

Fresh fruits

1.57

31.8

27.3

Deli meats

3.94

-13.3

-2.7

Cooking oil

2.05

25.6

12.5

Feta cheese

3.48

-8.3

-14.1

Public
transportation

1.89

16.9

5.4

Gasoline

2.97

-17.6

0.0

Potatoes

1.11

215.1

57.5

Milk

2.19

2.7

-6.0

Water

1.17

25.5

0.2

Eggs

0.98

-20.8

-11.8

Residential
rent

0.09

40.4

0.0

Cheese

0.92

-8.3

-13.5

Entertainment
(Cinema,
Theatre, etc.)
Soft drinks
and coffee

0.67

30.4

2.9

0.39

16.9

2.1

I

Cleaning
0.07
25.6
2.0
materials,
disinfectants.
Notes: Induded are products that represent at least 0.05 percent of the CPI and the pnces of which
have either increased by more than 16 or decreased by more than 4 percent (10 percentage points difference
from the increase in the overall CPI index, 5.86 percent). Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia,
Bulgaria.

19

Table 2
Products from the prices of which respondents primarily draw their perceptions
of overall inflation. The most frequent answers.
Products mentioned by
respondents

Feta Cheese
Foods
Milk
Meat
Cheese
Bread
Cooking oil
Electricity
Public transportation
Everythin~

Percent of respondents who
mentioned that product in the
group of respondents that
reported a perceived decrease in
prices
35.5
21.4
10.7
8.6
7.5
5.4
2.1
0.0
0.0
0.0

Percent of respondents who
mentioned that product in the
group of respondents that
reported a perceived increase in
prices
1.6
24.1
1.3
2.8
0.0
0.9
24.4
8.8
5.6 6.9

Table 3
Perceived inflation.
Bulgaria, May 1998
I

Decrease: equal to 1 if respondent mentioned a
product that actually decreased in relative price in
the last six months, 0 otherwise
Increase: equal to 1 if respondent mentioned a
product that actually increased in relative price in
the last six months, 0 otherwise
Female: 1 if female, 0 if male

Dependent variable: Equal to 1 if respondent
perceived an increase, 0 if no change, and -1 a
decrease in the general price level in the last six
months.
-1.32***
(0.14)
2.03***
(0.22)
-0.01
(0.08)

Age: 1 if over 45, 0 otherwise

0.09
(0.08)

Education: 1 if more than high school education, 0
otherwise

0.01
(0.11)

Cut 1

-1.32

Cut 2

0.40

Pseudo R"
N
Notes: Ordered problt. Standard errors

0.15
921
10 parentheses. *** slgruficant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4
Perceived Inflation.
Bulgaria, May 1998.

Dependent variable: Equal to ~ 1 if
respondent perceived an increase,
or a decrease in prices, 0 if no
change.
Proportion of household income
spent on food

Dependent variable: Equal to 1 if
respondent perceived an increase,
or a decrease in prices, 0 if no
change.

0.007**
(0.003)

1 if respondent is primarily
responsible for food purchases in
a household

0.10
(0.09)

Female: 1 if female, 0 if male

-0.12
(0.08)

-0.09
(0.09)

Age: 1 if over 45, 0 otherwise

0.15
(0.09)

0.09
(0.08)

Education: 1 if more than high
school education, 0 otherwise

0.14
(0.12)

0.10
(0.12)

Constant

-0.49
(0.20)

-0.03
(0.08)

Pseudo R1
N
Notes: Problt estimates. Standard errors

0.01
0.003
815
910
III parentheses. ** slgmficant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 5
Perceived and Expected Inflation.
B ulgana,
I . M ay 1998

The group of those
I who perceived a
decrease in prices
The group of those
who perceived no
change in prices
The group of those
who perceived an
increase in prices

Respondents who
expect a decrease
in prices
32
(33)

Respondents who
expect no change
in prices
45
(46)

Respondents who
expect an increase
in prices
20
(21)

Totals

21
(5)

369
(83)

55
(12)

445
(100)

12
(3)

88
(26)

244
(71)

344
(100)

65

502

319

886

Totals
Note: Numbers

In

I

97
(100)

parentheses are percentages.

Table 6
Attitudes toward government policies and expected inflation.

Group of political
supporters the current
government.
Group of political
opponents the current
government.
Difference
[T-statistic]

Percent of agents who
expect a decrease in
prices

Percent of agents who
expect no change in
prices

Percent of agents who
expect an increase in
prices

18

53

29

6

47

47

12***
[5.67]

5*
[1.78]

-18***
[-5.39]

Notes: ***(*) slgmficant at the 1(10) percent level.
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Table 7
Expected inflation.
Bulgaria, May 1998
Dependent variable: Equal to 1 if respondent
expects an increase, 0 if no change, and -1 a
decrease in the general price level in the next six
months.
Perceived Decrease: equal to 1 if respondent
perceived a decreased in prices in the last six
months, 0 otherwise
Perceived Increase: equal to 1 if respondent
perceived an increase in prices in the last six
months, 0 otherwise
Variable equal to 1 if respondent would vote today
for the party currently in office.

-0.25*
(0.13)
1.35***
(0.10)
-0.51 ***
(0.09)

Female: 1 if female, 0 if male

0.05
(0.08)

Age: 1 if over 45,0 otherwise

0.001
(0.08)

Education: 1 if more than high school education, 0
otherwise

-0.17
(0.12)

Cut 1

-1.50

Cut 2

0.74

0.21
Pseudo R '
857
N
Notes: Ordered problt. Standard errors In parentheses. ***(*) slgmficant at the 1(10) percent level.
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